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Abstract 
 Fair price is the important criterion in squeeze-out acquisitions. Entrepreneur’s law of 
Georgia unites mandatory tender offer and mandatory acquisition of shares under this hood. 
Both institutions are examples of compulsory contracting and with their essence are 
interruptions into shareholders property rights. In those cases, redemption is almost only 
measure offered to minority shareholders, which is exactly why it is vital to ensure, that 
shareholders receive adequate compensation for the unwilling disposal of their property.  
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Introduction 
 Fair price is the important criterion in squeeze-out acquisitions. For the purposes of 
this article, the term ‘squeeze-out” is considered as a situation, where a controlling 
shareholder exercises his legal right to oblige the minority shareholders of a targeted listed 
company to sell their shares of the target to him. Entrepreneur’s law of Georgia unites 
mandatory tender offer and mandatory acquisition of shares under this hood. Both institutions 
are examples of compulsory contracting and with their essence are interruptions into 
shareholders property rights. In those cases, redemption is almost only measure offered to 
minority shareholders, which is exactly why it is vital to ensure, that shareholders receive 
adequate compensation for the unwilling disposal of their property. 
 The article overviews lapses in the process of assessment of fair price under Georgian 
legislation and is based on international experience. It offers some modified approaches in 
order to protect minority shareholders interests.  
 The research is based on general scientific methodology. Abstractive-logical 
methodology is broadly used which includes analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction. 
Comparative legal methodology of research is also applied. 
 The article consists of the introduction, one main part and three paragraphs and the 
conclusion. The main text discusses all the problems connected with evaluation of fair price 
in Georgian legislation and judicial practice.       
 
Problems of establishment of fair price in Georgian legislation and practice 
General overview 
 Fair price principle applies in many corporate law relationships, but it is especially 
important in the process of squeeze-out, since, in some cases, it is the only remedy to protect 
minority shareholders interests. Unlike the mandatory tender offer, in case of mandatory 
acquisition of shares, minority shareholders have no opportunity to avoid selling shares. The 
only benefit that they might get from the transaction would be fair price, but the question is 
how faire that price will be. 
 The squeeze-out acquisitions are relatively new institutions in Georgian legislation. 
Emerging from common law into European law and through EU regulations into Georgian 
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law, squeeze-out is highly disputed in legal doctrine or practice. As much as it is possible to 
say on advantages or disadvantages, it is highly important to ensure that minority 
shareholders receive due compensations so that they would not have to give away their 
property for nothing. “Striking the right balance between the interests of minority/majority 
shareholders or, in other categories, interests of minority shareholders and facilitation of the 
efficient takeover market is one of the most troublesome tasks for the legislature and the 
judiciary dealing with the squeeze-out cases. This seems especially true with regard to 
compensation paid to the expelled shareholders in squeeze-out transactions” (Miliutis, 2013). 
 
Mandatory tender offer 
 The approach is different with mandatory tender offer and mandatory acquisition of 
shares. As already mentioned above, mandatory tender offer still leaves the chance to 
minority shareholders to reject tender offer if the redemption price is inappropriate. This 
conclusion is made on the basis of the Article 15.3 of the Law on Security Market (LSM) 
according to which “all proposals or recommendations […] on acceptance or repudiation of 
tender offer, as well as tender offer, must be conducted in accordance with regulations 
established by National Bank of Georgia.” Since Entrepreneurs Law of Georgia (EL) refers to 
LSM, the Article 15.3 must be applied in case of mandatory tender offer (Burduli, 2007, 24). 
 The Article 532 of EL regulates mandatory tender offers. One of the aspects of 
takeover is that a buyer must offer fair price for the shares to minority shareholders. 
 According to the Article 532.2 of EL “An auditor or a brokerage firm shall establish 
the offered redemption price. The offered redemption price must be no less than the 
maximum price that the redeeming shareholder has paid within the last six months for the 
company’s share of this class. The auditor or the brokerage firm shall draw up a report 
indicating the documented facts establishing the basis for the offered redemption price. The 
buyer shall reimburse the expenses of the auditor or the brokerage firm. The buyer shall also 
be obliged to provide the auditor or the brokerage firm with all information available to 
him/her/it on the purchase of shares. The auditor or the brokerage firm shall be held 
responsible with all his/her/its assets for damages he/she/it caused to the shareholder as a 
result of negligence or deliberately misestimating of the offered redemption price.“  
 Based on this article the main principles of the redemption of shares could be 
highlighted: 
1. The price must be fair; 
2. The definition of fair price is not established by legislation; 
3. Price is evaluated by auditor or brokerage; 
4. The minimal price is established by EL which equals to the maximum price of the 
share for past six months.   
 The problem with this regulation is that minority shareholders have no option to 
bargain and argue the established price. It is not comforting that EL establishes minimal price 
of redeeming shares, since this price equals to maximum price of the share for past six 
months. Squeeze-outs are usually associated with a preceding low market flee-float, which 
affects the price of shares. Even though EL refers to “minimal price”, in reality this is the 
only approach of calculation of fair price that is offered by Georgian legislation or doctrine in 
contrast with the experience of European countries (Germany and Austria, for example) 
where several methodologies of evaluation are set in place and often applied simultaneously 
(Dollinger, 2008). 
 Next problem is that assessment is delegated to audits or brokerage firms, while 
brokerage is completely underdeveloped in Georgia. I am inclined to agree with the position 
offered in Georgian legal doctrine, which considers the possibility for the minority 
shareholders to address the court if they do not consent with offered tender price. The Article 
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531.6 of EL must be applied in that case (legal analogy) (Burduli, 2007). Also, it is still 
unclear what part the court system will play in the process of establishment of fair price. 
Price of the share, itself, is not a legal category and evaluation requires special knowledge, 
which brings the necessity of expert conclusion. Some legal precision on the methods of 
evaluation must be welcome. 
 
Mandatory acquisition of shares 
   The approach is much stricter in case of mandatory acquisition of shares. The Article 
534.2 of EL states that the court shall decide on a mandatory acquisition of shares as 
determined in the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia. The fair value and the date of share 
redemption shall be fixed by court decision on a mandatory acquisition of shares as 
determined in the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia (CPC). 
 It is important to keep in mind that the first redaction of mandatory selling out of 
shares was declared void by the Constitutional Court of Georgia. Basic argument was that the 
law did not ensure offering fair price to minority shareholders. Constitutional court supported 
the idea of evaluation shares by independent brokerage companies or experts. Nonetheless, it 
is still doubtful whether the procedure adopted after the decision of the Constitutional Court 
guarantees necessary protection to minority shareholders and ensures them with due 
compensation for their the restriction of their property. 
      Though EL declares boldly that court fixes fair price, the appropriate articles of CPC 
and practice have different impression.  
 The Article 30912 (1-2) of CPC declares that to determine the fair redemption price of 
the shares, the court shall appoint an independent expert or a broker company within seven 
days after an application has been filed. An independent expert or a broker company shall 
prepare a redemption report that shall include documented circumstances of redemption as 
well as the method to be used for determining a fair redemption price of the shares and the 
price of the shares determined on that basis. The costs of an independent expert or a broker 
company shall be borne by the offeror. 
 The participation of parties is ensured only on the level of appointment of expert or 
brokerage.   
 The Article 30912 (3) states that when selecting an independent expert or a broker 
company, the court may take into account the opinions of the parties. The parties may 
recommend to the court candidates to be appointed [as experts]. The final decision as to who 
is to prepare a redemption report shall be made by the court. The parties may challenge an 
independent expert or a broker company on the grounds provided in the Article 35 of this 
Code. 
 CPC does not grant the possibility of disputing the offered price or representation of 
alternative evaluation to minority shareholders. In fact, court makes decision based on the 
evaluation provided under the Article 30912. Though, CPC states that when establishing a fair 
price for redemption of shares, a court shall take into account: 
 a)  the value of these shares on the stock market; 
 b) estimated revenues that the joint stock company may expect to gain in the future; 
 c) assets (including reserves, goodwill, experience, prospects and business 
relationships of the enterprise) and liabilities of the joint stock company. 
 CPC does not state based on which data the court should enquire these measures. As 
already mentioned, those criteria are not legal and require special knowledge and basically, 
court completely relies on the assessment of expert or broker. Generally, under CPC, all 
parties enjoy the possibility to challenge any proof provided by concurring party and 
represent alternative expert conclusion or evaluation. They are entitled to request additional 
or repeated expertise, while in the process of hearing cases on compulsory acquisition of 
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shares, parties lack those options. Of course, the fact that those procedures are monitored by 
court is much batter regulation but the interests of parties are not sufficiently protected and by 
“parties” both - the offeror and minority shareholders are meant, since broker might suggest 
risen or diminished redemption for shares.  
 Since the legislation is so imprecise, court practice must suggest at least some 
instructions on calculation of fair price. Today, this kind of case law is missing. There are 
really few cases on compulsory acquisition of shares and courts just make copy-pastes of the 
Article 30914 of CPC and do not even mention whether the offered price is fair indeed. It is 
probable that situation would be different if these particular cases where brought in front of 
the Supreme Court of Georgia, but, unfortunately, the decision of the Appeal Court on 
mandatory acquisition of shares is final.               
              
Conclusion 
 After the summarization of all the above mentioned, it is clear that Georgian 
legislation does not properly protect minority shareholders rights by guarantying them fair 
redemption in the process of squeeze-out acquisitions. The only approach of calculation of 
fair price offered in EL is based on the price of share for past six months. The approach is 
insufficient and too vague leading to unfair results in most cases. In case of mandatory tender 
offer, minority shareholders have no opportunity to discuss the offered price. It would be 
more appropriate if they at least had possibility to address the court. Although, nowadays, 
without further clarifications from legislation, court only plays part of some kind legalization 
institution and, roughly to speak, only puts seal on the offered price by expertise or broker not 
taking into account that under the Article 30914 of CPC, courts not only have right to say final 
word on fairness of price and, unless they find it due, turn down squeeze-out, but it is their 
obligation as well.           
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